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FEAR, HOPE, AND LONGING FOR THE FUTURE OF
AUTHORSHIP AND A REVITALIZED PUBLIC
DOMAIN IN GLOBAL REGIMES
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Rosemary J. Coombe*

I could begin this Article by describing it as a "work in progress"
but I have begun to think about that seemingly innocuous phrase as a
form of conceit that obscures particular privileges. For authorship is, I
believe, the special privilege of having one's creative efforts recognized as creating a "work" and the capacity to appeal to the state to
protect that work because it is a contribution to something we call
"progress" in the arts or sciences. The moral right (in some jurisdictions) to control the contexts in which one's work circulates is a rarer
privilege still. Authorship, I will suggest, is a status that gives rise to
rights, but it might also be considered a position of responsibility.
Moreover, it should also be considered a political accomplishment,
and one that peoples throughout the world struggle to achieve. In this
Article, I wish to articulate two visions-one of fear and one of hope,
and, to suggest a point of reconciliation of these visions located in a
broader frame of reference, the place of creativity in the international
human rights framework and its integral relation to issues of cultural
life and identity.
Let me make it clear at the outset that I will be using "authorship"
in a broad sense, to refer to the practice of state recognition of intellectual investment in "works," whether this be expressive creativity
(in copyright fields), scientific invention (the domain of patents), the
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Canada. B.A. (Hons.) University of Western Ontario 1981: LL.B. (With Great Distinction) University of Western Ontario. 1984: J.S.M. Stanford University. 1988: J.S.D. (Minor in Anthropology) Stanford University. 1992. The author is currently a Visiting Fellow at the Berkman Center
for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School and a Visiting Scholar in Comparative Media
Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The author was the Hosier Distinguished
Visiting Chair in Intellectual Property at the DePaul University College of Law in the spring of
2002. She wishes to thank Roberta Kwall as well as faculty and staff of the Center for Intellectual Property Law and Information Technology and the Sullivan Program for Human Rights in
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production of marketing vehicles (trademarks), the promotion of celebrity or the design of integrated circuit topography. In short, I mean
to allude to all of the domains of protection afforded by intellectual
property for so-called intangible assets. Putting to one side the dispute in legal scholarship about the centrality of the author and his or
her alleged "death" under conditions of postmodernism (one that
demonstrates a remarkable ignorance of the sociological meaning of
the term),' it is hardly necessary to insist upon the hegemony of the
"Romantic" author, 2 to assert that intellectual property philosophically and rhetorically relies upon a set of modern European understandings about the importance of authorial works as contributions to
human progress in the arts and sciences and thus to human civilization. 3 These understandings, moreover, pose great challenges for nonWestern peoples who seek to project and to protect alternative forms
of creative world making, and to new forms of creativity enabled by
digital technologies.
Authorship, to the extent that it holds the promise of recognition
for those who have traditionally been excluded from its purview, is a
status that brings benefits that many aspire to. However, our intellectual property regimes have developed in such a way that we recognize
an increasingly expanding field of authorial rights, disassociated from
any sense of authorial responsibilities; to this extent, the concept may
be too narrow for many political purposes. From a global rather than
1. For example, Jane Ginsburg does not find it necessary to engage with any of the extensive
interdisciplinary literature on the topic relevant to considerations of intellectual property in her
dismissal of postmodernism in her article in this volume. Jane C. Ginsburg. The Concept of
Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1063 (2003). For an extensive
discussion of the cultural, sociological, and historical meaning of the term and its various permutations and their significance for considerations of intellectual property, see ROSEMARY J.
COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP. APPROPRIATION

AND THE LAW (1998).

2. For discussion of romantic authorship see Peter Jaszi. Toward a Theory of Copyright: The
Metamorphoses of "Authorship," 1991 DUKE L.J. 455: Peter Jaszi & Martha Woodmansee. The
Ethical Reaches of Authorship, 95 S. ATLAN'i Q. 947 (1996). For a more critical view of the
role of this figure in intellectual property law generally. see Mark A. Lemley. Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property. 75 TEX. L. Rev. 873 (1997) (reviewing JAMES BOYLE, SHA-

MANS. SOFTWARE. AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY
(1996)). For an overview of the controversy and further development of the argument, see Ryan
Littrell, Note, Toward a Stricter Originality Standard for Copyright, 43 B.C. L. REV. 193 (2001).
3. See Rosemary J. Coombe, Works in Progress: Traditional Knowledge, Biological Diversity
and Intellectual Property in a Neoliheral Era, in GLOBALIZATION UNDER CONSTRUCTION:
GOVERNMENTALTII.
LAW AND IDENTITY (Richard W. Perry & William Maurer eds.. forthcom-

ing 2003). available at http://www.yorku.ca/rcoombe (on file with author): Michael D. Birnhack,
The Idea of Progress in Copyright Law. I BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 3 (2001): Margaret Chon,
Postmodern "Progress": Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power. 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97
(1993).
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narrowly North American perspective, there may be too many authorial rights and too few authorial responsibilities. Too much of what we
now protect under the guise of authorship is not creativity or innovation, but merely investment. Too much of the world's creativity is unrecognized, and when it is recognized, our global intellectual property
regimes provide rights without recognizing the responsibilities that
many peoples in the world hold-responsibilities to others, to their
ancestors, to future generations, and to the plants, animals, and spirits
that occupy and animate the worlds they inhabit. Can authorship be
revitalized to encompass this wider field of human obligation and energy? Can the exercise of intellectual property rights, like the exercise
of real property rights in the twentieth century, be limited and shaped
to address a larger range of social objectives?
One emerging and increasingly dominant position answers the latter question with a resounding "No!" This is a position of fear. It
encompasses, but is far broader than Jane Ginsburg's observation that
"copyright is in bad odor."'4 It is a position assumed by a number of
scholars, activists, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), feminists, advocates on behalf of the poor and subsistence farmers, and
some indigenous peoples. 5 Among legal scholars, this is usually a protest against the unprecedented expansion of copyright, trademark and
patent protections (although the criticism is most vocal within the
United States, such tendencies are arguably more profound elsewhere). Legal protections for intellectual property are expanding to
the detriment of new creators, shrinking the size and scope of the creative commons, threatening freedom of expression, putting obstacles
in the way of important research and innovation, and stifling important forms of democratic dialogue. 6 In the United States, the argu4. Jane C. Ginsburg. How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself. 26 CoLuM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS

61. 61 (2002).
5. In international policymaking circles. one increasingly hears NGO representatives arguing
that the patent system was designed for machines and manufacturing and has no place in the life

sciences. The "No Patenting of Life" movement, one of the many forms of resistance to the
implementation of the TRIPs Agreement. adopts this position, as do many farmers groups and
food security activists. For a discussion of civil society resistance movements, see Susan K. Sell.
Post-TRIPS Developments: The Tension Between Commercial and Social Agendas in the Context
of Intellectual Property. 14 FLA. J. I NT'L L. 193 (2002).

6. For representative examples see

EXPANDING THE BoiNDARIES OF IN IELLE(C-iUAL PROP-

SOciETiY (Harry First & Diane L. Zimmer(2002): THE
(Neil Netanel & Niva Elkin-Koren eds.. 2003). See also

FRTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE
man eds..

2001): PETER

DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITWAITE, INFORMATION FiEUDALISM

COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION
LAWRENCE

LESSiG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE CONIIONS IN A CONNECIED

(2001):

JESSICA LITMAN. Di6IiAL COPYRIGHT (2001): Wendy, J. Gordon. Eldred v. Ashcroft: Intellectual Property, Congressional Power, and the Constitution: Authors, Publishers, and
WORILD

Public Goods: Trading Gold for Dross. 36 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 159 (2002): M. Heller & R. Eisen-
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ment is that copyright and patent law has become unbalanced, and the
constitutional mandate for these rights has been lost under the weight
of a neoliberal vision that protects property at all costs and cannot
recognize the value of maintaining public goods. The essential distinction between ideas and expressions (or discoveries of nature and innovations) has been eroding, monopolies have become longer, and
opportunities to use works without the payment of monopoly rents
have declined as a consequence of technological change and international trade regimes. 7 Copyright and trademark are increasingly used
as tools of corporate harassment and censorship. 8 This is, moreover,
no longer the position of a few critical legal scholars-the enormous
success of Naomi Klein's book No Logo (and the anticorporate politics it both documents and incites) is evidence that the issue is becoming one of widespread social concern 9 (and not just amongst teenagers
who want free music, as conservative legal theorists dub those who are
committed to creating alternative moral economies of sharing intellectual work, creativity, and democratic dialogue in digital environmentsl').
An even more dire picture is painted by social theorist Jeremy
Rifkin, whose work, The Age of Access,"I suggests that under contemporary capitalist conditions, corporations focus on the management of
their intellectual property and increasingly divest themselves of physiberg. Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research. 280 Sci. 698
(1998): Arti Kaul Rai. Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms
of Science. 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 77 (1999). David Lange & Jennifer Lange Anderson, Copyright,
Fair Use and Transformative Critical Appropriation, Duke University Law School's Conference
on the Public Domain, Nov. 9-11, 2001 available at http://www.law.duke.edu/pd//papers.html
(last visited Mar. 3, 2003); Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Proteciton
of Computerprograms,94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994): J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson,
Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51 (1997); J.H. Reichman, Database
Protection in a Global Economy, XVI REVUE INT'L DE DROIT ECONOMIQUE 455 (2002).
7. SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN,

COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS:

PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY

THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL

(2001).

8. KEMBREW MCLEOD. OWNING CULTURE: AUTHORSHIP. OWNERSHIP. AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW (2001).

9. For a longer consideration of Naomi Klein's book and other recent considerations of the
social and cultural impact of expanding intellectual property protections, see Rosemary J.
Coombe, Commodity Culture, Private Censorship, Branded Environments, and Global Trade
Politics: Intellectual Property as a Topic of Law and Society Research, in A COMPANION TO LAW
ANID SOCIETY (Austin Sarat ed.. forthcoming 2003) (on file with author).
10. For recent discussions of new moral economies in digital environments, see Rosemary J.
Coombe & Andrew Herman. Culture Wars on the Net: Trademarks, Consumer Politics and Corporate Accountability on the World Wide Web, 100 S. ATLANTIC 0. 917 (2001): Diane Leenheer
Zimmerman, Authorship Without Ownership: Reconstructing Incentives in a Digital Age. 52
DEPAUL L. REV. 1121 (2003).
11. JEREMY RIFKIN. THE AGE OF ACCESS: THE NEW CULTURE OF HYPERCAPITALISM.
WHERE ALL OF LIFE IS A PAID-FOR EXPERIENCE(2000).
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cal property, real estate, and employees. The phenomena of "lean
production" suggests that companies shed themselves of all forms of
capital other than intellectual property, which can be licensed rather
than assigned, ensuring a continuous flow of revenue with none of the
burdens that attach to holding other forms of property. The strategic
licensing and pooling of trade secrets, patents, trademarks, copyrights,
and publicity rights creates new networks of control that are concentrating more and more power in fewer corporate hands to the detriment of research, innovation, and human health and food security.
The exercise of patents over gene sequences, for example, has created
circumstances of extortion that limit human access to vital health technologies (breast cancer tests being a recent example).
Rifkin makes this point using a number of examples. He shows how
the strategic use of intellectual property rights is being used to eliminate markets and restrict competition. For instance, the phenomenal
growth of franchising has usurped small businesses across North
America; today's franchisees bear all of the financial risks and all of
the burdens of employing people and owning property but have no
opportunity to develop independent goodwill. They are subject to
strict scrutiny and surveillance by those who hold the intellectual
property rights (in the name, logos, trade dress, packaging, etc.) who
are in a position to dictate the conditions under which business is
done; they are at continuous risk of losing their licenses. Unlike small
businesses of the past, these outlets are not free to adapt to local circumstances, support local causes, or respond to local needs. Those
who hold the real power by exercising the intellectual property rights
are not accountable to those who live in the communities from which
they extract profits, and their licensees are restricted in their capacities to do so by the very terms of the contracts that govern their use of
the intellectual property.
Another example concerns the conditions under which films are
produced. Rifkin sees the "Hollywood Organizational Model" as exemplary of a "network-based approach to organization" that threatens to become dominant in a number of fields. 12 Whereas the early
film industry relied upon Fordist mass production principles and vertical integration (control over theatres and box offices), the forced divesture of cinema chains under antitrust law compelled the industry to
consider new methods of production that relied upon more customized creation of fewer products-the "blockbuster"-whose value was
built through the careful management of public relations, advertising,
12. 1d. at 24-29.
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and merchandising tie-ins. Such values relied upon legal recognition
of more and more aspects of the expressive product and its merchandising as exclusive properties. Securing and managing these intellectual property rights enabled companies to ensure streams of revenue
by linking films to expanding realms of popular consumption while
outsourcing the film's production. More and more small companies
are involved in production, but they are dependent upon fewer and
fewer industrial players for investment capital and will see none of the
royalties from the film's performance, distribution, reproduction, or
derivatives. The burden of owning assets, employing people, and the
environmental costs or other negative externalities of production can
thus be avoided by producers whose profits are dependent primarily
upon the management of intellectual property rights. For Rifkin, this
model is paradigmatic of tendencies in all "information-based" industries, whose major assets are intangible ones, protected by intellectual
property rights. As increasing numbers of industries aspire to become
more "knowledge-intensive" then, it would seem to follow, control of
intellectual property will ensure greater concentrations of power and
less accountability of such power to workers, communities, consumers,
or environments of habitation.
On the global front., perspectives on intellectual property are no
more sanguine. The position of fear is more accurately sounded as a
cry of alarm. The role of multinational business elites-the world's
most powerful industrial authors-in incorporating intellectual property under global trade regimes has been described as manipulative,
coercive, and instrumentalI3-taking exploitative advantage of huge
inequalities of bargaining power to force developing countries into an
agreement that was never in their interests-and continuing to use the
trade dependency that the United States has cultivated to push states
to implement even more extensive intellectual property protections
than the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement) itself requires. 14 Some critics have
even called this "a planned attack on the institutions of civil
society."15
Communications scholars bemoan the fact that through the TRIPs
Agreement, international informational liberalization policies have assumed hegemony, limiting the ability of states to ascertain public in13. Peter Drahos, Global Property Rights in Information: The Story of TRIPs at the GATT. 13
PROMETHEUS 6, 9 (1995).
14. Sell, supra note 5.
15. John Frow. Public Domain and the New World Order in Knowledge, 10 SoC. SEMIOI ICS
173. 176 (2000).
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terests for their citizens in the arena most essential to democracy
itself-namely the structure, form and accessibility of expression in
the public sphere. 16 The proprietary rights of industrial authors have
completely eclipsed other rights-rights of cultural self-determination,
rights of creators to their moral interests, rights of access to information, rights of citizen access to media and communications forums, and
rights to pursue independent national cultural policies. Again, it
might be too early to make such dire predictions; the radical privatization of the culture of the public domain will face a number of challenges as states create national exemptions1 7 and hopefully, tailor
local regimes to meet democratic (and I would add, developmental
and cultural) objectives.' 8 However, the growing tendency of the
United States and Europe to put trade pressure on developing states
to sign onto bilateral treaties that demand an even higher level of intellectual property rights than required by TRIPs Agreement has recently limited optimism on this front.
By now, no doubt, you are anxious for me to articulate a position of
greater hope for authorship's futures. There is hope, and a great deal
of energy, going into the project of making intellectual property less
Eurocentric in the forms of authorship it recognizes, the creative activity it embraces, and the values that it can be used to protect. The
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has embarked on a
new mission to "reach out to new beneficiaries"-sending fact-finding
missions around the world to ascertain how the intellectual property
system could be used, amended, or altered, to better protect "traditional or indigenous knowledge" as well as putting renewed energy
into mechanisms to protect folklore. 1 9 This mission is supported by a
number of other United Nations (U.N.) institutions, such as the U.N.
Environment Programme, the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
16. Shalini Venturelli. Cultural Rights and World Trade Agreements in the Information Society.
60 GAZL'rFE: IN-'L J. FOR COMM. STUD. 47 (1998).

17. J.H. Reichman. The TRIPS Agreement Comes of'Age: Conflict or Cooperation with the
Developing Countries?, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INTL L. 441 (2000).
18. Nell Weinstock Netanel. Asserting Copyright's Democratic Principles in the Global Arena.
51 VAND. L. REV. 217 (1998).
19. The WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources. Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC) is a forum where governments discuss matters relevant to three primary themes. These themes concern intellectual
property issues that arise in the context of: (i) access to genetic resources and benefit
sharing: (ii) the protection of traditional knowledge. innovations and creativity: and
(iii) the protection of expressions of folklore.
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge, and Folklore: Intergovernmental Committee (IGC) Overview: Establishment and Mandate, at http://www.wipo.int/global
issues/igc/index.html (last visited Mar. 6,2003).
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(UNESCO), and the U.N. Development Programme, all of whom are
invested in ensuring that intellectual property serves a larger range of
human rights commitments.
For more than 180 states, the use of intellectual property to further
the protection of biological diversity, contribute to sustainable development, and "protect, promote, and encourage the use of the knowledge, innovations, and practices of indigenous communities and
communities embodying traditional lifestyles" to further these ends is
a legal obligation embraced by virtue of ratifying the Convention on
Biological Diversity. To the extent that state parties have also committed themselves to ensuring that their intellectual property protections are used in a fashion conducive to these ends, this has created
some guarded hopes (as well as some anxieties) that intellectual property laws might begin to recognize, inter alia, the authorship of traditional healers, rural plant breeders, female cultivators, and ecological
landscape designers. The activities of these peoples are increasingly
recognized as creative, innovative and valuable contributions to sustainable development-works, in other words, that contribute to a
new understanding of human progress. 20 These works are also recognized to be cultural in nature, occasionally held by individuals, but
more often by families, clans, lineages, and moieties. The peoples
who create these works do so in culturally specific ways; to the extent
that their languages and cultures are threatened by linguistic assimilation, logging, mining, and modern agricultural encroachment, efforts
to protect and preserve their traditional knowledge may also be a
21
means of pursuing cultural self-determination.
Scientists, social scientists, and policy-makers are increasingly aware
that biological diversity is not something "discovered" in nature, but
something that has been cultivated by human beings over extensive
periods of time. Nature, in other words, may be one of the biggest
human artefacts, in two senses. First, the Western world created the
concept, which is largely a mythic one, of pristine wilderness to advance its own colonial and imperialist agendas. Second, those areas of
the world we regard as the most pristine, in fact appear to be the product of complex human landscape management22 (a term which does
an injustice, I believe, to the cosmologies of those peoples who regard
20. For a longer discussion of this topic. see Coombe, supra note 3.
21. For a longer discussion, see Rosemary J. Coombe. The Recognition of Indigenous Peoples'
and Community Traditional Knowledge in InternationalLaw. 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 275 (2001).
22. For a popular discussion, see Charles C. Mann. 1491. 289 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 41 (2002).

Ethnographic and historical work in the Amazon reveals the complex ways in which the
rainforest, rather than being a pristine environment, has been constructed by human cultural
intervention. See HUGH RAFFLES. IN AMAZONIA: A NATURAL HISTORY (2002).
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themselves as parts of an ecosystem of interdependence and ongoing
responsibility-resource management being an inappropriate industrial term). The world environmental community now understands
forests as anthropogenic, habitats as culturally inscribed, and seeds as
cultivated, not simply in breeding labs, but in the smallest of farmers'
fields. Nature, in other words, is a product of human creativity. Not
surprisingly, the rhetoric of authorship has been increasingly deployed
to draw attention to these accomplishments.
Elsewhere I have described this process as one of redefining the
location of the "raw and the cooked" on global terrain. 23 I believe
that this expansion of the vocabulary of authorship is integrally linked
to both trade liberalization and the growth of informational capital.
The so-called "level playing field" for international trade ensures that
some goods-like genetic resources, timber, textiles, know-how, practices, and knowledges extracted from developing countries-flow
freely, whereas others-like genetically modified or industrially developed seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, software, and medicine-do not
flow freely but are conveyed only as monopolies that command
lengthy payments of rent for each use of their informational content.
Those who are seen to provide mere resources, data, or information to
a "common heritage" or "public domain" are at a great disadvantage
compared to those whose creative contributions are recognized as authored works, protected by intellectual properties. To the extent that
the information contained in genetic resources is understood to be
created or authored by the innovative activities of rural peoples, then
its availability can be circumscribed, and flows of such resources monitored and controlled to enable new forms of benefit-sharing. According to the logic of these propositions, these peoples, too, inscribe
effort and expression into material forms to which they add value, and
this value should be recognized when biodiversity is drawn upon in
the activities of industrial authors.
There are many reasons to be uneasy about the prospects of expanding intellectual property rights wholesale to these newly recognized arenas of cultural creativity, and many of these objections have
been made by indigenous peoples themselves (who insist upon tying
any recognition of their intellectual properties to their heritage rights
as indigenous peoples, and thus to their claims to territory, and eventually, forms of self-determination). Many are fearful of any attempt
to expand intellectual property rights in these new directions. This socalled "copyrighting of culture" will only further imperil the public
23. Coombe. supra note 3.
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domain; it may enable elites to enforce forms of censorship within
communities; it has the potential to freeze cultural identities, and shut
down desirable hybridities. 24 Peoples are members of societies, not
cultures, and cultural forms cannot be located and sequestered inside
artificial boundaries. 25 Communities should not be romanticized because their evocation often serves to reinforce constitutive forms of
social exclusion and authoritarian forms of governance. 26 The distinc27
tion between traditional and modern knowledge is a specious one.
(This is not the argument that "information wants to be free" in John
Perry Barlow's oft-quoted phrase, but that knowledge tends to flow
and to develop, and in democratic societies, we regard this as a good
thing.) Here, it would seem, the First Amendment and the fair use
doctrine are at risk by overreaching natives-for some reason always
imagined as male, patriarchal, and meanly protective of their traditional authority.
Such fears are both abstract and overstated; they certainly do not
appear to be based upon any familiarity with actual international negotiations involving indigenous peoples, developing countries, and
civil society organizations. Rather than assuming the scope and parameters of the public domain to be appropriate and just, we might
consider the conditions under which the "properties" that indigenous
peoples and local communities seek to protect were put into the public domain. To what extent did the publication of these materials involve the prior informed consent of the peoples who shared these
practices, innovations, and forms of knowledge? To what extent did
the use made of these properties accord with the understandings and
agreements of the communities from which they derived? We need to
be alert to the fact that breaches of fiduciary duty and breaches of
confidence in government, academic and private research involving
indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities were common in the past,
24. See MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? (forthcoming 2003).
25. For examples of this argument, see Michael F. Brown. Can Culture be Copyrighted?, 39
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 193 (1998); Stephen B. Brush, Bio-prospecting the Public Domain,
14 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 535 (1999).
26. For a recent overview of the romanticism and social violence that often lies behind the
evocation of community, see MIRANDA JOSEPH. AGAINST THE ROMANCE OF COMMUNITY
(2002). For a consideration of issues of inequality and power that are often obscured by the
evocation of community in participatory development, see THE MI'rH OF COMMUNITY: GENDER
ISSUES IN PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT (Irene Gujit & Meera Kaul Shah eds., 1998). For the
assertion that evocations of community often elide issues of governance, see Richard Peet &
Michael Watts, Introduction to LIBERATION ECOLOGIES 5 (Richard Peet & Michael Watts eds.,

1996).
27. Arun Agrawal, Dismantling the Divide Between Indigenous and Scientific Knowledge, 26
DEV. & CHANGE 413 (1995).
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and that relations of trust were often violated. 28 These peoples have
often been legally incapacitated in terms of protesting such injustices
and seeking redress. However, the politicization of issues of cultural
heritage through the articulation of the principles that animate the
Draft Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 29 may revitalize their claims. Throughout these and other related U.N. negotiations the dynamic and innovative nature of cultural tradition has been
insisted upon and widely acknowledged, rather than any timelessness,
purity, or essence. Moreover, the rights of women and children have
been central to these new cultural assertions which are, significantly,
made in a human rights framework in which other rights-such as
freedom of expression, rights of access to human heritage and benefits
from technology, and rights to benefit from the fruits of one's labormust be balanced. 30 In any case, new regimes of rights will not be
absolute but will require new principles of limitation and forms of
exemption.
Many progressive North American scholars of intellectual property
have placed their energies behind the revitalization of a "cultural public domain" and the maintenance of a "creative commons."' 3' If, however, this exercise is going to serve the political aspirations of a wider
range of creators, then a few caveats seem in order. A cultural public
domain framed entirely by American legal principles, without consideration of the legal circumstances in which most of the world's peoples
find themselves runs the danger of appearing to be both self-serving
and imperialist. To the extent that we are committed to the cultural
public domain, we need to consider a wider range of activities and
practices than those that copyright law traditionally recognized as acts
of authorship and those most characteristic of Western creators. A
vibrant cultural domain will also require consideration of means to
maintain cultural diversity and ongoing dialogue across and between
cultural traditions.
28. See MARIE A.

BA-rnISTE & JAMES Y. HENDERSON,

PROTEI ING INDIGENOUS KNOWL

EDGE AND HERITAGE: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE (2000).

29. United Nations, Huinan Rights Comm. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

U.N. ESCOR. I Ith Sess., Annex 1,U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2 (1993).
30. For a longer discussion of the conflicts of rights that may be entailed by considerations of
cultural rights in relation to traditional knowledge relevant to the conservation of biological
diversity, see Rosemary J. Coombe. Intellectual Property, Human Rights, & Sovereign y: New
Dilemnmnas in International Law Posed by the Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge and the Conservation of Biodiversity. 6 IND. J. GI.OBAi- LEGAL SiU. 59 (1998).
31. Duke Law School's Conference on the Public Domain (Nov. 9-11. 2001). at http://wwvw.

law.duke.edu/pd/papers.htmi (last visited Mar. 5,2003): Creative Commons, at http://www.creativecommons.org (last visited Mar. 5. 2003).
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Discussion of the public domain in North American legal academic
circles tends to concentrate upon issues of fair use and the First
Amendment, with some attention to new forms of contractual licensing in digital environments and vague allusions to common property
regimes in political formulations, which are generally liberal, libertarian, or anarchistic. Intellectual property laws, however, have jurisprudential habitats other than the U.S. Constitution and European
philosophical traditions. Intellectual property rights are human rights,
as are rights of access to the public domain, rights of collectivities to
maintain their cultural integrity and to participate in decisions involving the use of their cultural heritage. 32 The international human rights
framework provides a rich and fertile source of legal and normative
resources with which to consider limitations to intellectual property
rights and principles for delineating the parameters of a public domain
forged around a greater range of political aspiration and conceptions
of social justice. To the extent that the United States (among Liberia,
Turkey, and South Africa) has never signed and ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 33 it is not
surprising that it tends to be overlooked here, but it is important to
realize that this is an isolated position and that these rights are accepted (even occasionally in the United States itself) as part of international customary law and thus as the normative framework through
which national laws should be interpreted.
Proponents of the public domain should be aware that if we focus
too exclusively upon concepts of fair use and the jurisprudence interpreting the intersection of copyright, patent, trademark, and the First
Amendment, we are concerning ourselves with local ordinances in a
world of global interconnections increasingly governed by neo-liberal
trade regimes, which have a tendency to narrow the realms of their
applicability. The First Amendment is a remarkable privilege; many
peoples in the world, even those living in putative democracies, do not
live in societies where free speech is recognized as an overarching
value. Even those, like myself, who are citizens of states that do enjoy
a constitutional right to freedom of expression may live with judicial
systems unwilling to recognize that the exercise of intellectual property rights may conflict with fundamental expressive freedoms.

32. For a consideration of the international cultural human rights framework in which intellectual property is situated, see Coombe, supra note 30 and literature cited therein.
33. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 19. 1966. 993 U.N.T.S. 3. A list of signatory and nonsignatory states may be found at http://
www.hri.ca/fortherecord2002/documentation/reservations/cescr.htm.
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The situation with respect to fair use is more dire. For example,
when Canada was in the process of considering legislative copyright
amendments in order to comply with the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) and TRIPs Agreement, our legislators were
greatly assisted by U.S. industrial intellectual property rights holders,
who were the most organized and effective lobbyists on the scene. It
was persuasively argued that Canada had no need for a fair use provision to replace its incredibly narrow "fair dealing" clause, which prohibits any balancing of interests. Indeed, the simultaneous
proliferation of collecting societies (many of which bear nicely patriotic names, such as the Copyright Collective of Canada, who represents the U.S. independent motion picture and television production
industry for all drama and comedy programming 34) were designed to
create conditions that reduced the transaction costs for the blanket
licensing of copyright works to user groups. Under such conditions, it
became reasonable to maintain the position that if a work could be
easily licensed with minimal transaction costs, no use of a work (other
than minor quotation news reporting or for critical review accompanied by an acknowledgement of the copyright holder) should be
deemed a fair one. Nearly all unlicensed uses, in other words, were
presumed to be unfair. We should also be cognizant of the fact that
the major copyright industries have an interest in isolating the United
States and its robust fair use jurisprudence and that these principles
may be subject to challenge under international trade regimes. Recent regional trade agreements clearly reflect this tendency to narrowly enumerate permissible usages and thereby usurp the policy
balances enabled by fair use determinations. As Ruth Okediji has argued, U.S. fair use provisions could easily be interpreted as impermissible usages even under the TRIPs Agreement itself (although she
also provides an analytical framework that might be used to counter
such assertions). 35 To the extent that the World Trade Organization is
now opening itself up to more participation by global civil society organizations and is coming under the scrutiny of international human
rights bodies, 36 we will forego a necessary and valuable opportunity if
we continue to address the public domain only through the lens of
national and parochial legal categories rather than through a body of
34. A list of Copyright Collective Societies may be found at http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/societies/
index-e.html.
35. Ruth Okediji. Toward an InternationalFair Use Doctrine. 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 75
(2000).
36. See, e.g., U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. 52nd
Sess.. 25th Meeting. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000, 17 Aug. 2000.
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international law, which has the allegiance (in principle, if not always
in practice) of a far wider community of nations.
I want to move here from positions of fear and hope to one more
akin to longing or yearning. Although critical intellectual property
scholars have long been concerned with the reckless expansion of intellectual property rights, many of us also had political aspirations for
the future of intellectual property that were wider than simply protecting rights of access to cultural forms. For example, in the Bellagio
Declaration of 1993, a group of us, including Jamie Boyle, Peter Jaszi,
and Pamela Samuelson agreed that:
In general, we favor increased recognition and protection of the
public domain. We call on the international community to expand
the public domain through expansive application of concepts of fair
use, compulsory licensing, and narrower initial coverage of property
rights in the first place. But since existing author-focused regimes
are blind to the interests of nonauthorial producers as well as to the
importance of the commons, the main exception to this expansion
of the public domain should be in favor of those
who have been
37
excluded by the authorial biases of current law.
Thus, we advocated consideration of sui generis, and/or neighbouring rights regimes to protect works of cultural heritage, folklore, and
traditional environmental knowledge. The ecosystem knowledge of
indigenous peoples and those whose traditional cultural knowledge of
local ecosystems nurtures the ongoing creation of biological diversity
upon which the world's food security depends, has since this time, become an issue of great importance within the United Nations. I have
been privileged to work with the Indigenous Caucus of U.N. Working
Groups under the Convention on Biological Diversity and to observe
ongoing deliberations at WIPO on protections for folklore, traditional
knowledge, and genetic resources. When participating in such deliberations, it becomes clear that for peoples whose creative efforts have
for centuries been considered "the common heritage of mankind," the
public domain is perceived as a concept that justifies their ongoing
impoverishment. It is a term they hear as legitimating the appropriation of cultural forms that are reduced to mere resources, data, and
raw material for the "works" recognized as the authorial properties of
Western others. It functions, from their perspective, as a zone for expropriations that deny them their membership as peoples in the world
of nations and respect as creators in their own right. I would hope
that these peoples are taken into account when we consider issues of
access in authorship. A cultural public domain might consider our re37. Jaszi & Woodmansee. supra note 2.

2003]

FEAR, HOPE, AND LONGING

1185

sponsibilities as well as our freedoms, recognizing that freedom is
more than mere license, that liberties are not necessarily libertarian
and that the acts of appropriation we champion are not only creative,
critical, and transformative, but ethical-attentive to the conditions
under which we come to have access to cultural resources and their
meanings in the life worlds of others. The demand of indigenous peoples and traditional communities is not simply for compensation (although a liability rule regime such as Jerry Reichman has proposed
might well accomplish local benefits in this area 38) but for authorial
recognition as peoples, partners, and participants in the preservation
of cultural diversity to serve longer-term objectives for greater distributional justice.
In the next fifty years it is estimated that we will lose forever
thousands of the remaining human languages in the world as well as
the cultural knowledge that these languages embody. The peoples
who speak these languages are under threat-their livelihoods are imperilled as they are displaced from ancestral lands by mining, timber
companies, and modern agriculture, and pushed into urban economies
that cannot support them. The biological diversity they nourish, they
nourish precisely through their distinctive cultural knowledges of local
ecologies. The environmental metaphor that James Boyle suggests we
adopt when considering the politics of protecting the informational
commons is apt, 39 but it is important to remember that the concept of
ecology is not simply one of relationships between parts of a natural
world or amongst social actors but also acknowledges the cosmologies
that link people and environments with their ancestors, animal spirits,
and obligations to future generations. Yale legal scholars may believe
that First Amendment freedoms are the ideal embodiment of liberty
for the human imagination, 40 but other peoples occupy other relationships to cultural forms-trust, secrecy, respect for the sacred, social
institutional forms such as initiation, ritual regard, obligations to ancestors, descendents, and an ethics of care with regard to spirits and
other nonhuman living things. The cultural survival of peoples-another recognized human right-will require that our authorial appro38. J.H. Reichman. Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable
Innovation. 53 VAN[:). L. REV. 1743 (2000).
39. James Boyle. A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalismfor the Net, available at

http://www.james-boyle.com (last visited Jan. 25, 2003).
40. Jed Rubenfeld, for instance, believes that the current interpretation of the U.S. copyright
statute is unconstitutional with respect to the making of derivative and transformative works
because it conflicts with the human freedom of imagination most perfectly embodied in the First
Amendment. See Jed Rubenfeld. The Freedom of Imagination:Copyright's Constitutionalits,. 112
YALE L.J. 1 (2002).
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priations do not involve depredations or desecrations. Certain takings
of cultural goods do create cultural, social and political harms to peoples for whom cultural forms are more tightly interwoven with specific
forms of subsistence in local lifeworlds of meaning. For this reason,
respect for the limited common property regimes of others (as Carol
Rose has suggested 41 ) should not be overlooked in the cultural public
domain we seek to conceptualize and implement. Indeed, the U.N.
Development Programme, the U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, the Convention on Biological Diversity's Working Group on Access and Benefit Sharing, as
well as the Working Group on the Draft Declaration of the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples 42 have all in various ways commented negatively
on the relentless expansion of industrial intellectual property rights,
and, along with WIPO, proposed that indigenous customary laws be
considered viable sources for judicial resources to inform model legal
regimes at the international level.
A more inclusive public domain, however, is not one in which we
are called upon merely to acknowledge closed local fiefdoms over cultural resources, but is more appropriately considered a space of opportunity for cross cultural dialogue. Let me conclude by providing
three examples.
The first example is an intergovernmental and civil society initiative
that indicates that the desire for a public domain premised on the affirmation of cultural diversity is widely shared. The adoption by acclamation of the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity
in November 2001 illustrates that many states desire recognition for
"the legitimate right of States to support and create a favourable environment for the creation and expression of diverse forms of culture,
through the creation of cultural policies. '43 The Declaration affirmed
that cultural goods, as vectors of identity, value, and meaning, must
not be treated merely as commodities or consumer goods. The underlying belief is that trade liberalization is undermining cultural diversity, but the position is not a defensive one:
It is important to add, though, that even if globalization is changing
national cultures in the anthropological and sociological sense, this
41. Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public Property in
the Information Age. available at http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/papers/rose.pdf (last visited Jan.
25. 2003); Conference on the Public Domain at Duke University, Nov. 9-11. 2001.
42. United Nations Development Programme, at http://www.undp.org (last visited Jan. 25.
2003); United Nations Environment Programme, at http://www.unep.org (last visited Jan. 25,
2003).
43. The Expert's Committee on the Strengthening of UNESCO's Role in Promoting Cultural
Diversity in the Context of Globalization.
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does not mean that any political initiative that might influence these
cultures in one way or another should be rejected. To assert the
contrary would be to attempt to freeze these cultures and national
identity and lend them a meaning that would only benefit those
people who hope to turn them into instruments of political control.
Any national culture to remain vibrant and alive must adapt over
time to a variety of changes, both internal and external. The real
problem that globalization poses for national cultures is whether the
changes it brings about in values' lifestyles, and ways of doing things
detract from the opportunity to '[translate], promote and maintain a
pluralistic public space where citizens can access and participate in
cultural life . . . whether it leaves enough space beyond the simple

expression of
producer-consumer relationship for the democratic 44
the cultural choices that these citizens wish to make.
This initiative brings together a group of fifty-three states and cultural policy ministries as well as a civil society network of cultural producers who are concerned that the strategy of "cultural exemptions"
under trade agreements is ill conceived and that cultural diversity
among and within societies needs to be positively affirmed as a fundamental social and public good, if not a human right. Cultural diversity
promotes social cohesion, economic development, and democratic values and practices. It requires cultural exchange, international cooperation and dialogue, as well as positive policy measures to support
minority cultures. Rather than "freeze" cultural identities, such measures are designed to enable more peoples with distinct traditions to
participate in cultural life, which is after all, a fundamental human
right.
A second instance involves a Western musical band named Enigma
who developed a musical composition titled Return to Innocence that
contained, inter alia, a sample of a recording of the music of an indigenous group-the Ami-residing in Taiwan. As this music was neither
individually authored nor fixed in material form, it did not attract
traditional copyright protection, even assuming that groups of rural
people with oral traditions would have the capacities to secure the
protections afforded by national copyright systems. It appears that
the music was first recorded in 1978 by visiting researchers for what
was locally understood to be archival purposes and later found its
way, unbeknownst to the elderly singers, on a compilation of Chinese
folk music and an album released in France.
The resulting lawsuit relied upon international conventions on performance rights to insist that indigenous peoples had the right to pro44. Ivan Bernier. A New InternationalInstrument on Cultural Diversitv: Questions and Answers, available at http://www.incd.net/html/english/conf/bernier.htm (last visited Apr. 8. 2003).
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hibit the use of fixations of performances that were unauthorized by
the original performers. It received national support and international attention when the Enigma song, using the sample of the singers, remained on Billboard Magazine's international chart for thirtytwo consecutive weeks, the album went multi-platinum and the song
was chosen as an anthem for the 1996 Atlanta Olympics. Arguably
the song's popularity enabled the original singers to discover the appropriation (friends who heard their voices in the song while traveling
congratulated them for their international success). The artists were
under contract to a Taiwanese record company who wanted to bring
Taiwan's aboriginal music to a wider audience, and were no doubt
concerned about losing its market share to Enigma and other world
music bands who had access to these historical recordings. Certainly,
without the record company's financing, it is doubtful that a lawsuit
could have been launched or financed and without the help of international entertainment lawyers committed to the rights of third-world
peoples, the suit would likely never have come to a settlement.
The ultimate settlement, however, provided more than mere compensation for the two singers whose performances were used. 45 Formal thanks were given by the defendant record companies for the
contribution that their work as practitioners of oral culture made to
the song, the singers were given full credit on liner notes in future
releases of the work, and, more importantly, a foundation for the
preservation and revitalization of tribal musical culture was established with the proceeds. World attention was drawn to the cultural
traditions of Taiwanese first nations and several indigenous musicians
representing different ethnic groups in Taiwan have now received recording contracts and incentives for the ongoing development of culturally distinctive musical traditions as well as opportunities to
collaborate with musicians from other cultural backgrounds.
The historical particularities of Taiwan's indigenous peoples' relations with the state are significant here, for they illustrate just how
resilient cultural traditions may be when people are given cultural opportunities. 46 In the late 1980s, few knew anything about Taiwan's
groups of Malayo-Polynesian aborigines. Indeed, many of these social
45. There are a series of Internet news articles that contain details about the settlement. See
Taiwanese Settle Lawsuit Claiming Their Original Composition Was Stolen: They' Will Now Set
Up Foundation, at http://www.geocities.com/enigma-monk/article4.html (last visited Jan. 25,
2003): Ami Sounds Scale Olympian Heights, at http://www.sinorama.com.tw/8508/508006el.htm
(last visited Jan. 25, 2003); World Music Singer Difang of Taiwan's Ami Tribe Dies at 81 (Mar. 29,
2002). at http://geocities.com/enigma/air/rtiarticle6.html (last visited Jan. 25. 2003).
46. This discussion is drawn from Michael Rudolph. Heidelberg University Institute of Chinese Studies. Taiwan Aboriginal Culture Resources: Die Ureinwoher Taiwars. at http://www.sino.
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groups and their languages were considered extinct. Taiwan's national
government had denied their existence for years, actively suppressing
any expression of ethnic diversity after 1945. Like most of the world's
indigenous peoples, they were unable to study or speak their own languages and forced to abandon traditional lifestyles and resources.
When the first Taiwan-born president in Taiwan's history was appointed in 1990, a multi-cultural Taiwanese identity was newly acknowledged and supported. Aboriginal groups were officially
recognized as indigenous peoples with specific cultural rights in accordance with international human rights norms. This political recognition, however, is contingent and may at any time be put at risk
depending upon the state of Taiwanese relations with People's Republic of China. The Chinese government asserts the cultural and genetic
homogeneity of all Chinese peoples, including those in Taiwan who
are thus implicitly deemed to be members of the ethnic Han majority.
Given that as recently as the 1970s and 1980s many of these aboriginal
peoples were widely considered to be extinct and their traditions endangered, if not lost to humankind, this revival of Ami musical traditions is a remarkable story of cultural revitalization. A political
commitment to a creative commons, a robust public domain, and a
vigorous First Amendment would not have been sufficient or even desirable to enable this cross cultural exchange, but more likely would
have hastened this music's decline. The rights of Western authors to
access cultural forms for the purposes of creative transformation need
to be balanced with other human rights, if only because there may be
no more of such music to sample from in the very near future, given
the circumstances in which most of the world's indigenous peoples
find themselves. In short, Western arts of appropriation might be
practiced so as to further the maintenance of, or at least stem, the
ongoing destruction of cultural diversity.
A third example also indicates the possibility that acts of appropriation may serve wider social purposes when the liberal impulse to seek
resources from the so-called "public domain" is countered with the
cultural rights claimed by others. In 2001, Maori lawyers who represented indigenous NGOs wrote letters of complaint to the Lego Corporation about the content of its "Bionicle" action toy figures, which
used Maori words and historical figures combined ahistorically with
terms and mythical figures from Easter Island and Polynesian cul-

uni-heidelberg.de/staff/rudolph/aborres.htm (last visited Jan. 25. 2003). Rudolph maintains interlinked web pages on Taiwanese aboriginal culture.
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tures. 4 7 When Maori lawyers brought their concerns to Lego lawyers,
they made it clear that they had no desire to prohibit all representations derived from Maori culture from the international toy market.
Rather, they objected to the fantastic hybridizations of cultural traditions the game effected and the unintentionally disrespectful use of
religious terms such as the titles of healers and spiritual advisors. Maori groups offered to engage in a dialogue of reconciliation that would
permit appropriate and respectful usages. Lego sent representatives
to New Zealand to confer and, as a consequence of their meetings, the
corporation agreed to engage Maori advisors as consultants in the development of a code of conduct for governing the use of traditional
knowledge in the manufacture of toys. The Maori, in turn, will help
Lego and other corporations make contact with indigenous peoples.
Rather than protecting their cultures by isolating themselves and sequestering cultural forms, they sought to ensure that these mass-market appropriations served as educational as well as entertainment
vehicles that promise greater recognition for indigenous peoples who
too often have been reduced to primitive caricatures in Western mass
media.
Unfortunately, there is little evidence that the Lego Corporation
fulfilled its commitments. There is, however, ample evidence of a
proliferation of Internet discussion between Lego Bionicle fans and
Maori cultural activists about freedom of speech and the significance
of cultural forms, the nature of language in shaping cultural identity,
and relationships between power, privilege, and respect in digital environments. Not all of this communication is civil, some of it is vituperative, aggressive, and even hostile. Nonetheless, the mutual process of
education around issues of cultural identity and the First Amendment
48
is a hopeful sign for the future.
Indigenous peoples (and local communities) active in global fora
often seek forms of recognition that will enable their participation in
new forms of collaboration that value the specificity of the knowledge
they bring to global dialogues. By considering both intellectual property rights and rights to the public domain within a larger human
rights framework, the social, economic and cultural rights of others
47. See Lego Game Irks Maoris, May 31. 2001, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/
1362435.stm (last visited Mar. 7, 2003): Kim Griggs, Maori Take on hi-tech Lego Toys, Oct. 26.
2001. at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1619406.stm (last visited Mar. 7. 2003): Lego
Agrees to Stop Using Maori Names. Oct. 30, 2001. at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/
1627209.stm (last visited Mar. 7, 2003).
48. For a discussion about this communication. see Andrew Herman & Rosemary Coombe,
Dancing Masks in Legoland: Cultural Wars of Property and Propriety in Cyberspace (to be available at http://www.law.yale.edu/isp/democracy conference-main.html) (on file with author).
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assume a new significance. Ultimately, perhaps, we should work to
ensure that respect for human creativity, aspirations for the "cultural
public domain," and the protection of a creative commons, is a multicultural and dialogic activity that links culturally diverse commons
through respectful negotiations that cross borders, build bridges, and
open minds.
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